FC Zenit coaching staff. Who will be the new coach of Zenit? Let's figure it out now. Maria Burova, physical training coach

The list of candidates for Zenit coaches is not final

On Monday, the management of the St. Petersburg club reduced the short list of candidates for the vacant post of head coach after the resignation of Roberto Mancini from five to three. But who was eliminated? And is the list of potential successors to the Italian limited to the initially announced names?

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Zenit itself, we recall, on the eve of the meeting of the board of directors at the Gazprom office, named Sergei Semak, Maurizio Sarri, Paulo Fonseca, Marcelo Gagliardo and Jorge Sampaoli as candidates. The club even held a fan vote on social networks to find out which head coach people prefer. According to the results of the survey, “our own” Semak, as expected, won (63.8 percent of the votes). Next were the Italian Sarri (19.8), the Portuguese Fonseca (6.4), the Argentines Sampaoli (6.1) and Gallardo (3.9). And after the board of directors, at which Semak was present and Zenit President Sergei Fursenko was sharply criticized by Alexey Miller, information was received about the elimination of two participants from the “race”. True, without indicating last names.

Articles | The best is Fonseca, but they will choose Semak: who will become the new coach of Zenit

Until the final decision has been made, it’s time to start a guessing game: who was crossed out and who is still being considered. But how to compare specialists so different in age, experience, number of titles and transfer requests? The Zenit shortlist again gave an outside observer the feeling of the absence of a clear medium-term strategy. All last years every off-season it was formed in a hurry, under the chosen coach, and not vice versa, as it should be. And each time it was easily abandoned in order to clear away the rubble again after the next resignation. In such conditions, participants in the struggle for the position of head coach of Zenit were usually measured by pomp or popularity, and not by the number of professional merits within the framework of criteria clearly formulated by management.

And yet the situation at Zenit is changing. Conversations with people who are in close cooperation with the club convince us that they do not intend to step on the old rake in St. Petersburg. A general line was drawn at the board of directors: first, decide on the principles of development for the next few years - and then choose a coach based on them.

The main rule of the new Zenit is to spend less and earn more. From this point of view, Semak is an ideal candidate. It is obvious that the salary of the head coach of Ufa will be at least five times less than that, which Sarri or Fonseca will agree to. Semak, answering questions from Gazprom bosses, clearly did not put forward conditions like “I’m waiting for goalscorers, and therefore expensive strikers.” And Sergei Bogdanovich has a second powerful trump card. In the summer, not only Artem Dzyuba and Oleg Shatov will return to Zenit from loan, but also a dozen more players (Robert Mack, Ibragim Tsallagov, Ernani, and so on). Semak knows all of them very well from working on the coaching staffs of Luciano Spalletti and Andre Villas-Boas. This means that it will be easier for him to put together a combat-ready team from the available resources.

SEMAC, EXPANSION AND LAWYER

Therefore, those who do not believe in the 42-year-old are wrong Russian coach only on the basis that Zenit is not an experimental testing ground. The situation has changed radically. As part of the new development concept, it was more of an experiment (and a daring one at that) to spend nearly 100 million euros and distribute 17 people on loan for the sake of fifth place and a third consecutive miss from the Champions League. It turns out that Semak can be congratulated in advance on his appointment? Still no.

Konstantin Lemeshev* 1941 (to May) 3 0 2 1 3-4 Mikhail Okun* May - June 1941 5 2 1 2 9-10 Konstantin Kvashnin* 1943 Konstantin Lemeshev 1944-1945 22 8 7 7 35-31 Winner of the USSR Cup 1944 Mikhail Butusov 1946 14 4 2 8 12-25 Ivan Talanov 1946-1948 42 13 8 21 53-86 Konstantin Lemeshev 1948-1950 84 36 19 29 130-136 Georgy Lasin** 1950-1951 30 12 8 10 42-42 Vladimir Lemeshev 1952-1954 37 18 3 16 49-52 Nikolay Lyukshinov 1954-1955 42 12 15 15 46-52 Arkady Alov 1956-1957 32 5 14 13 35-65 Georgy Zharkov 1957-1960 76 29 20 27 119-114 Gennady Bondarenko 1960 10 5 1 4 13-12 Evgeny Eliseev 1961-1964 117 39 36 42 159-150 Valentin Fedorov 1964-1966 85 27 25 33 86-97 Arkady Alov 1967 36 6 9 21 28-63 Artyom Falyan 1968-1970 82 21 28 33 73-104 Evgeny Goryansky 1970-1972 80 27 25 28 93-84 German Zonin 1973-1977 146 41 57 48 160-177 Vladimir Kornev** August - October 1977 7 3 1 3 12-10 Yuri Morozov October 1977-1982 170 58 47 65 206-222 Bronze medalist of the USSR Championship 1980 Pavel Sadyrin December 23, 1982 -
June 1987 148 63 42 43 205-160 USSR Cup finalist 1984
USSR Champion 1984
Winner of the USSR Season Cup 1985 Vladimir Golubev 1987 (since July) 14 4 4 6 14-15 Stanislav Zavidonov December 17, 1987 -
July 1, 1989 39 13 10 16 39-47 Vladimir Golubev 1989 (since May) 21 3 8 10 20-35 Anatoly Konkov January - May 1990 7 1 3 3 5-9 Vyacheslav Bulavin 1990 (since May) 31 7 11 13 30-32 Yuri Morozov 1991 - March 1992 42 11 14 17 44-50 Vyacheslav Melnikov March 1992-1994 110 49 28 33 167-127 Pavel Sadyrin December 1994-
November 4, 1996 76 37 9 30 97-79 Bronze medalist of the First League Championship 1995 Anatoly Byshovets November 22, 1996 -
November 22, 1998 64 25 21 18 70-54 Anatoly Davydov** September 24, 1998, and. O.
November 24, 1998 -
April 25, 2000 35 11 12 12 39-39 Winner of the Russian Cup 1998/99 Yuri Morozov from April 25, 2000, and. O.
May 31, 2000 -
July 5, 2002 67 33 19 15 102-67 Finalist of the Intertoto Cup 2000
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2001
Finalist of the Russian Cup 2001/02 Mikhail Biryukov 5'th of July -
August 26, 2002, and. O. 9 2 2 5 14-17 Boris Rappoport August, 26th -
November 17, 2002 9 0 4 5 7-14 Vlastimil Petrzhela November 29, 2002-
May 3, 2006 96 48 25 23 159-106 Silver medalist Russian Championship 2003
Winner of the Premier League Cup 2003 Vladimir Borovichka May 3-17, 2006, and. O. 3 1 1 1 3-4 Dick Lawyer June 26, 2006-
August 10, 2009 98 46 33 19 165-103 Champion of Russia 2007
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2008
Winner of the UEFA Cup 2007/08
Winner of the UEFA Super Cup 2008 Anatoly Davydov from August 10, 2009, and. O.
October 3 -
December 11, 2009 13 9 3 1 24-8 Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2009 Luciano Spalletti December 11, 2009 -
March 11, 2014 124 74 37 13 239-106 Winner of the Russian Cup 2009/10
Russian Champion 2010
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2011
Russian Champion 2011/12
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2012
Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2012/13
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2013 Sergey Semak March 11-20, 2014, and. O. 1 0 0 1 0-1 Andre Villas-Boas March 20, 2014-
May 21, 2016 69 44 16 9 142-60 Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2013/14
Russian Champion 2014/15
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2015
Winner of the Russian Cup 2015/16
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2015/16 Mircea Lucescu from May 24, 2016 0 0 0 0 0-0 Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2016

** Lasin replaced K. Lemeshev in away matches in September 1950, Kornev replaced Zonin in August-October 1977, Davydov replaced Byshovets in October 1998. Match statistics are counted for Lemeshev, Zonin and Byshovets, for Kornev they are highlighted separately for clarity.

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If the commanders had been guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, how clear it should have been for Napoleon that, having gone two thousand miles and accepting a battle with the probable chance of losing a quarter of the army, he was heading for certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that by accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, just as it is clear that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change.
When the enemy has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the Battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately compared to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand; one hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to one hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If they say that, having occupied Moscow, he thought how to end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is a lot of evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, he knew the danger of his extended position, he knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw the situation in which Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate.
In giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later brought up intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the commanders, who, of all the involuntary instruments of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures.
The ancients left us examples of heroic poems in which the heroes constitute the entire interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time a story of this kind has no meaning.
To another question: how were the Borodino and Shevardino battles that preceded it fought? There is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the matter as follows:
The Russian army allegedly, in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin.
The Russians allegedly strengthened this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodin to Utitsa, at the very place where the battle took place.
Ahead of this position, a fortified forward post on the Shevardinsky Kurgan was supposedly set up to monitor the enemy. On the 24th Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it; On the 26th he attacked the entire Russian army standing in position on the Borodino field.
This is what the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter can easily see.
The Russians could not find a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed through many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not settle on any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a people’s battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the previous positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was fought) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position any more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, if you were guessing, you could point to with a pin on the map.
The Russians not only did not strengthen the position of the Borodino field to the left at right angles to the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812, did they think that the battle could take place at this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications at this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not finished even on the 26th; secondly, the proof is the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt: the Shevardinsky redoubt, ahead of the position at which the battle was decided, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, all efforts were exhausted and six thousand people were lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, proof that the position in which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written in the heat of the moment after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the Battle of Borodino were being written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander-in-chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as a forward post (while it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the Battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-chosen position, whereas it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.
The thing, obviously, was like this: the position was chosen along the Kolocha River, which crosses the main road not at a right angle, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was in Shevardin, the right near the village of Novy and the center in Borodino, at the confluence of the Kolocha and Vo rivers yn. This position, under the cover of the Kolocha River, for an army whose goal is to stop the enemy moving along the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious to anyone who looks at the Borodino field, forgetting how the battle took place.
Napoleon, having gone to Valuev on the 24th, did not see (as they say in the stories) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodin (he could not see this position, because it did not exist) and did not see the forward post of the Russian army, but stumbled upon the Russian rearguard in pursuit to the left flank of the Russian position, to the Shevardinsky redoubt, and, unexpectedly for the Russians, transferred troops through Kolocha. And the Russians, not having had time to engage in a general battle, retreated with their left wing from the position they had intended to occupy, and took up a new position, which was not foreseen and not fortified. By going to left side Kolochi, to the left of the road, Napoleon moved the entire future battle from right to left (from the Russian side) and transferred it to the field between Utitsa, Semenovsky and Borodin (to this field, which has nothing more advantageous for the position than any other field in Russia ), and on this field the entire battle took place on the 26th. In rough form, the plan for the proposed battle and the battle that took place will be as follows:

If Napoleon had not left on the evening of the 24th for Kolocha and had not ordered an attack on the redoubt immediately in the evening, but had launched an attack the next day in the morning, then no one would have doubted that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of our position; and the battle would take place as we expected. In this case, we would probably defend the Shevardinsky redoubt, our left flank, even more stubbornly; Napoleon would have been attacked in the center or on the right, and on the 24th a general battle would have taken place in the position that was fortified and foreseen. But since the attack on our left flank took place in the evening, following the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the battle of Gridneva, and since the Russian military leaders did not want or did not have time to begin a general battle on the same evening of the 24th, Borodinsky’s first and main action The battle was lost on the 24th and, obviously, led to the loss of the one fought on the 26th.
After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, by the morning of the 25th we found ourselves without a position on the left flank and were forced to bend back our left wing and hastily strengthen it anywhere.
But not only did the Russian troops stand only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications on August 26, but the disadvantage of this situation was increased by the fact that the Russian military leaders did not recognize the completely accomplished fact (the loss of position on the left flank and the transfer of the entire future battlefield from right to left ), remained in their extended position from the village of Novy to Utitsa and, as a result, had to move their troops during the battle from right to left. Thus, during the entire battle, the Russians had twice as weak forces against the entire French army directed at our left wing. (Poniatowski’s actions against Utitsa and Uvarov on the French right flank were actions separate from the course of the battle.)

The experience of cooperation with Vlstimil Petrzhela should be considered successful: from that moment until the present time, the club invites specialists from abroad to work (exceptions are Anatoly Davydov and Sergey Semak, who worked with the prefix “acting” for several matches in 2009 and 2014, respectively *). It is curious that if at first each new foreign specialist worked almost as much and even longer than his predecessor, then recently foreign coaches do not stay at Zenit for long. Vlastimil Petrzela and Dick Advocaat worked for more than three years, Luciano Spalletti - almost four years, Andre Villas-Boas lasted for two years, and Mircea Lucescu and (most likely) Roberto Mancini had a “shelf life” of only a season. During the work, in this case we take the interval from the first to the last official match at the head of Zenit.

If Mancini leaves Zenit at the end of the 2017/18 season, he will become the first foreign coach in history who failed to win a single title with the blue-white-blues.

* - at the end of the 2009 season, Davydov was approved as head coach; after the 30th round he left his post.

Vlastimil Petrzela (Czech Republic): 3 years, a month and 18 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 145 matches +73 =41 -31; balls 245-151; 59.7% points

Titles: Premier League Cup (2003)

Dick Advocate (Holland): 3 years, a month and 3 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 139 matches +68 =42 -29; balls 234-143; 58.9% points

Titles: champion of Russia (2007); Russian Super Cup (2008); UEFA Cup (2007/08); UEFA Super Cup (2008)

Luciano Spalletti (Italy): 3 years, 11 months and 24 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 184 matches +105 =47 -32; balls 325-176; 65.5% of points (including two technical defeats in the Czech Republic)

Titles: champion of Russia (2010, 2011/12); Russian Cup (2009/10); Russian Super Cup (2011)

Andre Villas-Boas (Portugal): 2 years, a month and 27 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 101 matches +62 =20 -19; balls 195-88; 67.9% points

Titles: Russian champion (2014/15); Russian Cup (2015/16); Russian Super Cup (2015)

Mircea Lucescu (Romania): 9 months and 28 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 41 matches +26 =7 -8; balls 76-34; 71.9% points

Titles: Russian Super Cup (2017)

Roberto Mancini (Italy): 9 months and 17 days (as of today)

Statistics in all tournaments: 43 matches +21 =13 -9; balls 68-34; 58.9% points

Titles: -

Photos used: FC Zenit; “Sport Day by Day” (Igor Ozersky)

The specialist’s agreement with the blue-white-sky blues is for two years with the possibility of extension for another year.

Sergei Bogdanovich Semak was born on February 27, 1976 in the village of Sychanskoye, located near Voroshilovgrad (now Lugansk), in Ukraine. A product of local football, Semak at the age of 16 ended up in the Karelian Asmaral system, and then in CSKA. A month after his debut in the main team, Semak scored his first goal, and less than a year later, at 19 years old, he became the youngest team captain in the history of Russian football.

In 2005, Semak left the army team, accepting an offer from PSG. In the same year he was awarded the title of Honored Master of Sports. From Paris, Sergei Bogdanovich first went to Moscow, where he also quickly became one of the leaders, and then moved to Rubin Kazan, with which he won the first championship title in the club’s history.

In 2007, having surpassed the bar of 100 goals scored in the Russian championships, he entered the Club of 100 Russian scorers of the Sport Express newspaper and the Grigory Fedotov Club.

In 2008, he returned to the national team, where he became captain of the team that won bronze medals at the European Championship. Member of the Igor Netto Club (for players who have played more than 50 matches for the Russian national team).

Semak played for Zenit from August 2010 to June 2013. Over three seasons, he played 72 matches with the team, scored 13 goals and provided 7 assists.

In June 2013, he accepted Luciano Spalletti's offer to join the blue-white-blue coaching staff as assistant coach. On March 11, 2014, he was appointed acting head coach of Zenit. Under his leadership, the team played two matches: the blue-white-blues lost to CSKA with a minimal score (0:1), and then beat Borussia Dortmund (2:1) away.

On March 20, 2014, Semak entered coaching staff Andre Villas-Boas. In September 2015, he led Zenit for six matches of the Russian Championship due to the Portuguese’s disqualification. After leaving, Villas-Boas continued to work on Mircea Lucescu's coaching staff.

In August 2014, he joined the coaching staff of the Russian national team, where he worked with Fabio Capello and, after the Italian left, with Leonid Slutsky.

On December 30, 2016, he was appointed to the post of head coach of Ufa. The team finished the 2017/18 season in sixth place, which became best result in its history and allowed it to enter the UEFA Europa League for the first time.

Football club "Zenith" congratulates Sergei Semak on his return to St. Petersburg and wishes him good luck as the head coach of the blue-white-blues!

Zenit head coach Sergei Semak, after a closed meeting with fans at the Petrovsky stadium, spoke about the past event and upcoming work, but did not specify the future of the players or name the names of the new coaching staff.

How was the meeting with the fans?
- Initially, the meeting was planned in Udelny Park, but then everything changed. The guys asked to drive up for five minutes, I said there was no problem. There is time now. It's nice to see the fans' attention. I understand perfectly well that I am at the very beginning of the journey. It's hard to say anything except that there will be a lot of work right now. This is a step forward in my career.

- What was the conversation about?
- General phrases about the team. About what the fans would like to see.

- Did you easily agree to Zenit’s offer?
- It doesn’t happen easily, especially in such a situation. Any decision is difficult. However, if you take on something, you need to try to do it to the maximum. The appointment took place quickly, with elements of surprise.

- Who will be on the coaching staff?
- It’s too early to talk about this. There was a lot of information, but most of it was not true. We will resolve issues with the team and training camp in the near future.

- Alexander Nizelik, who worked with you at Ufa, can join your headquarters at Zenit?
- Naturally, he is among the possible candidates.

- And Kerzhakov?
- No, I didn’t talk to Sasha about this. I don't have such information.

- You first came to negotiations about two weeks ago. What happened during these 14 days?
- I don’t know what happened these days. We had a conversation. The Zenit management voiced their position that I was one of the candidates. Then there was another meeting, but it was not specific. Last night the conversation went in a different direction.

- Many players will return to Zenit, including Dzyuba and Shatov. Do you have any idea about their future?
- You will find out everything very soon. I have all the information on the players: who is and where they are. Zenit had many players on loan. Very soon you will find out who will go to the training camp and who will not.

- When will you have your first training session?
- As planned. Medical examination on June 15th, departure for the first training camp on the 17th.

- There was a lot of talk that Igor Denisov would return to Zenit.
- I can’t say anything about the players. There was little time. There's a lot to work on and a lot to weigh. Igor Denisov is a top player, one of the strongest in his position. Any coach likes his game.

- What goals were set by management in terms of results? Champions League and first place or building a new team?
- Now we have a lot of players under contracts, we need to sort this out, and only then talk about a new team. Regarding the tasks, the management will announce them closer to the season. Of course, Zenit must fight for the championship and play in the Champions League.

- Was there a conversation about the sports department? Will Vyacheslav Malafeev, Oreste Cinquini stay? Will there be a new athletic director?
“There was a conversation about everything, but it takes time to analyze everything before making decisions.”

- We understand that you can’t say anything about the players, but there is one football player who...
- Messi?

- No, Miguel Danny said that he was ready to devote several more years to Zenit, that he would be glad to return. Are you considering his candidacy?
- We are considering all players who can help our team.